There Is No “Problem of Evil:” A Response
Responding to Douglas Giles’ article about the problem of evil, or lack thereof
This article is a direct response to Douglas Giles’ article titled There Is No “Problem of Evil.” I recommend that all readers pause here and read Giles’ original article before continuing with this article for needed context.
In their article, Giles uses an explanation of the problem of evil from the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Their version of the argument is as follows:
1. If God exists, then God is omnipotent, omniscient, and morally perfect.
2. If God is omnipotent, then God has the power to eliminate all evil.
3. If God is omniscient, then God knows when evil exists.
4. If God is morally perfect, then God has the desire to eliminate all evil.
5. Evil exists.
6. If evil exists and God exists, then either God doesn’t have the power to eliminate all evil, or doesn’t know when evil exists, or doesn’t have the desire to eliminate all evil.
7. Therefore, God doesn’t exist.
This is certainly a valid argument. If we assume all the premises to be true, then the conclusion indeed follows from the premises. The argument that Giles is making is that the above argument, while valid, is not sound.
Unlike a valid argument, which depends solely on the conclusion following from the premises independent of the truth of said premises, a sound argument depends on the conclusion following from the premises and that the premises are true. If the premises aren’t true but the conclusion still follows, then the argument is valid but not sound. If the premises are true and the conclusion follows, then the argument is sound.
Determining the truth of the premises is not an easy task as it is highly variable depending on which version of God one is talking about. Different religions might agree that some god exists, but disagree on the properties of such a god. For example, the Christian faith accepts that the tri-omni God mentioned in the problem of evil exists. This is a God that is all-good (omnibenevolent, or “morally perfect”), all-knowing (omniscient), and all-powerful (omnipotent). However, other religions believe that God, or gods, exist but make no claims that said God/gods are omnibenevolent, omniscient, or omnipotent. The problem of evil holds only when talking about the tri-omni God and cannot be used to argue against any other formulation.
Assuming that we are talking about the tri-omni God, Giles posits that there is a problem with one of the premises in the argument.
“…what is missed is a logical hole within premise four. That would be clause, “God has the desire to eliminate all evil.” The unspoken assumption which invalidates the argument is that desiring something means one will necessarily act to accomplish it.” — Douglas Giles
Giles then goes on to ask why God would be obligated to eliminate evil.
“Seriously. Why do you think God should make everything perfect for you or anyone else? Even if you believe that God created everything and has a plan for everything and dominion over everything, and so on, what does God owe you?
Sorry to be blunt, but that is at the heart of the “problem of evil.” It is an assumption made by both the religious and the atheists that God is obligated to eliminate evil, as if humans can construct, in their conception of logic, an argument that dictates to the Universe how it must be. That God must eliminate evil is an unproven and unprovable assumption that once removed dissolved the “problem.” — Douglas Giles
I think this is a misunderstanding of premise four. It’s not that God is obligated to eliminate evil, it’s that God desires to eliminate evil. These are two separate things. If God is obligated to eliminate evil then it implies that humans want God to do so and hold God to some standard. If God desires to eliminate evil, it means that God does not want evil to exist for their own internal reasoning independent of human desires. This is God wanting to do something, not humans saying that God should do something. It makes no sense that an omnipotent God, who has the ability to do all logically possible things, would want something but choose not to do it. This would imply that God didn’t really desire such a thing in the first place. The only reason we, as humans, do not do things we desire is because of some barrier in place, whether physical or mental, that prevents us from doing such. For an omnipotent and omnibenevolent God, such barriers would not exist.
Of course, one could make the argument that everything about God can be described as human obligation given the view that humans created the idea of God rather than God actually existing. But, the problem of evil is an internal critique of the idea that God exists with certain properties, so we have to assume that God does exist while critiquing it. We have to play along with the idea that God has such desires.
If God wants to do something and God cannot do that thing, then it holds that God is not omnipotent as, by definition, any omnipotent being would be able to do anything they want.
You could make the claim that God does not have the desire to eliminate evil, but this creates a contradiction with the idea of omnibenevolence, which is one of the basis of the argument. It makes no sense to talk about the problem of evil outside of omnibenevolence, omniscience, and omnipotency, as it would go against premise one. If premise one is false, then the entire problem of evil goes away but so does the idea of the tri-omni God. If you hold that the tri-omni God exists, then you must necessarily hold that premise one is true. Premises two, three, and four all follow as definitions of the terms in premise one.
It’s possible to raise a different concern with premise four; that being that the definition of omnibenevolence as “desiring to eliminate all evil” is incorrect. The term omnibenevolent has many different definitions including the direct translation from Latin of “ all good-willed” and “unlimited or infinite disposition to do good.” You could take these definitions as implying that God desires to eliminate evil as it is the opposite of good, but they do not specifically state such. Unfortunately, the religious texts on which the tri-omni God is based offer no definitive answers on the specific meaning of omnibenevolence, at least to my knowledge. Despite this, many apologists cling to the idea that an omnibenevolent God would desire to eliminate evil so I believe it’s a fair enough definition. In any case, definitions could be argued ad infinitum since they are necessarily subjective. If one accepts that an omnibenevolent God desires to eliminate evil, which is a popular belief and implied by the common “all-good” paraphrasing of omnibenevolence, then the problem of evil holds.
By a desire to eliminate evil, apologists usually mean unnecessary evil. For example, apologists may believe that a particular act of God that humans would describe as evil may be necessary to bring forth some greater good that offsets the evil act. This brings up the question of omnipotency. I can think of no act that would require evil for the greater good from the standpoint of an omnipotent God. No matter what the outcome, God could have caused it to happen in the first place without the necessity of evil. To claim otherwise would be to claim that there is something that God cannot do; that God is not omnipotent.
Next, Giles references William of Ockham and his belief that God is not subject to logical reasoning.
“That belief in rational determinism, a religious idea still hanging on in some circles, was rejected by William. He countered that the Universe is contingent on God’s will. God is not a slave to logic. Importantly, we are also not a slave to determinism. God has free will; we have free will. William would answer to the “problem of evil” that God can do whatever God wants. If evil exists, God has a reason for not eliminating it.” — Douglas Giles
As humans, logical reasoning is the best we have when it comes to trying to understand the universe we live in. If you make the claim that the best we have is not good enough to understand something, then what are we to do? To insist that God does not adhere to logical reasoning is akin to saying that we could never understand God so why even try? That’s the complete antithesis of philosophy. It implies that God could create logical contradictions such as a glass that is simultaneously full and not full of water or a rock so heavy that an omnipotent God could not lift it. It’s an apologist's way of saying “I’m right and there’s nothing you can do to prove otherwise.” It’s a clear case of special pleading akin to playing a game with a kid who continuously makes up new rules such that they can never lose.
“Again, sorry, but I have to be blunt. The “problem of evil” isn’t actually about God or religion. It is about your expectations. Expecting God to solve your problems is immature and ignorant. Using the “problem” as a disproof of God is also immature and ignorant.” — Douglas Giles
The problem of evil itself does not disprove the conception of God as a whole, but, in my opinion, it does an excellent job of bringing up several contradictions with the idea of the tri-omni God. I disagree with the stance that the problem of evil says anything about our expectations as humans. It posits the opposite, that it is God’s desire to eliminate evil, and ponders why evil exists given such a desire.
